Something I've often considered is whether, upon hypothetically discovering that I am actually inhabiting a world simulation, would I consent to being "unplugged" from the simulation. We know from the old story of Plato's Cave (and modern retellings of it like The Matrix) that those with a philosophical impulse should consent to being unplugged; if only so that they may discover what is really real, in contrast to the world of appearances.
But this doesn't seem so clearcut to me. For example, if I were told that upon being unplugged I would never get to see my family members again (we can suppose that they are really just computer simulations), then I would certainly not want to be unplugged. I surely would want to discover the world of reality (as it were), but I personally do value the experiences I have had and may have in the future with my family than I do with what I may potentially discover after being unplugged.
And it doesn't even have to be that specific: if I were told that the world of reality is an atemporal world, but that upon being unplugged I would experience an eternal moment of bliss (a sort of secularized beatific vision), I still wouldn't want to be unplugged. To be sure, I do desire to inhabit a world of unending bliss, but I would say that a temporalized version of this is much preferable to an atemporal version.
And this all makes sense from a Transhumanist standpoint: one of the goals we often hear from various Transhumanists concerns the desire for mind uploading. This, I take it, expresses a philosophical view that that certain experiences as such are more valuable. So "taking the blue pill" needn't be seen as willful ignorance, for it can also express a profound philosophical tendency, rooted in the value of experience as such.
